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Ninth Circuit Finds that
the Limited Partners in a
Land Development
Project May Sue for
Securities Fraud, but
the General Partner May
Not
In Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d
1495 (9th Cir. 1989), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the limited
partners' interests in a land development project were securities
within the meaning of federal and
state securities laws. However, the
court held that the general partner's interest in the development
was not a security. The court also
found that while the evidence supported the limited partners' Washington Consumer Protection Act
claims, the evidence did not support such a claim by the general
partner.
Background
In 1974, Wallace Teuscher
("Teuscher") bought 2,400 acres of
land known as Badger Mountain
South, located in Benton County,
Washington. Between October
1975 and January 1, 1976,
Teuscher sold 48% of the land
through his broker Edward Borkowski ("Borkowski"). Twelve unsophisticated investors bought the
property as low-risk investments.
In June 1977, Teuscher consolidated his assets with Asghar Sadri
("Sadri"), an experienced real estate investor, and formed a general
partnership called Triangle Land
Company ("Triangle). Teuscher
contributed his remaining 52% interest in the Badger Mountain
South property to the new partnership. In 1981, a limited partnership called BMS, Ltd. ("BMS")
was formed to develop the Badger
Mountain South property. The
twelve investors who purchased
48% of the Badger Mountain South
property became limited partners
and Triangle became the general
partner in BMS. Thus, Teuscher
and Sadri were general partners in
Triangle which, in turn, was the
general partner in BMS.
48

In 1984, Sadri and the twelve
limited partners sued Teuscher
and Borkowski (herein referred to
collectively as "Teuscher") in the
United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that
Teuscher violated federal, Washington, and Oregon securities laws
as well as Washington's Consumer
Protection Act by misrepresenting
the property value and investment
potential of the Badger Mountain
South property. After a three-week
trial, the jury rendered a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs on all of their
claims. Teuscher appealed the
jury's verdict to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
The Investment Contract
Definition of a Security
On appeal, Teuscher argued that
the plaintiffs could not recover on
their securities law claims because
their interests in Badger Mountain
South were not securities. The
court noted that federal, Oregon
and Washington statutory definitions of a security include investment contracts. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1989); Wash. Rev. Code §
21.20.005(12) (1989); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 59.015(16)(a) (1988). An
interest satisfies the investment
contract definition adopted by the
federal and Washington courts
when the interest is (1) an investment of money (2) in a common
undertaking (3) with profits to
come solely from the efforts of
others. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). Oregon's
definition of an investment contract differed from the federal and
Washington definitions only in
that Oregon required the profits to
come "through the management
and control of others," rather than
"solely from the efforts of others."
Pratt v. Kross, 276 Or. 483, 555
P.2d 765, 773 (1976).
The Twelve Limited Partners.
Teuscher argued that the twelve
limited partners' interests did not
meet the third element of the investment contract test. The third
element is met when the efforts
made by persons other than the
investor are the efforts which significantly determine the outcome
of the enterprise. Teuscher argued

that the twelve limited partners'
efforts significantly affected the
success or failure of BMS. The
court noted that although the limited partners attended meetings
and approved Teuscher's plans for
the development, none of the limited partners were sophisticated
business people. Furthermore, the
limited partners testified that
Teuscher represented himself as
the manager of BMS, that they
relied on Teuscher's purported expertise to make the enterprise a
success, and that they merely supplied the capital. The court held
that because the twelve limited
partners' efforts played almost no
role in the success or failure of
BMS, their investment in BMS
constituted an investment contract.
In order to establish federal and
state securities fraud, the twelve
limited partners also had to prove
that they relied on Teuscher's misrepresentations and omissions in
deciding to invest. Teuscher
argued that the twelve limited partners had failed to prove this element of their securities fraud case.
The court found convincing the
limited partners' testimonies that
Teuscher had lied to them about
the value of the property and its
potential as a low-risk investment,
and that the investors relied on
that information when they decided to invest in BMS.
The court, therefore, upheld the
jury's verdict on the twelve limited
partners' securities fraud claims.
The General Partner. On the
other hand, the court held that due
to Sadri's general partnership
agreement with Teuscher, Sadri's
interest did not meet the third
element of the investment contract
test. In making this determination,
the court focused on the language
of the general partnership agreement between Sadri and Teuscher,
rather than on how the partnership
operated its business.
The general partnership agreement referred to Sadri and
Teuscher as "co-partners" with
rights governed by the Washington
Uniform Partnership Act. Wash.
Rev. Code § 25.04 (1989) ("the
Partnership Act"). The co-partner
interests of Sadri and Teuscher, as
defined by the Partnership Act,
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included equal rights to manage
and control the partnership (Wash
Rev. Code §§ 25.04.180(5) and
.240(3)), equal access to the business records (Wash Rev. Code §
25.04.190), and limited transferability of the general partnership
interests (Wash Rev. Code §
25.04.180(7)). The general partnership agreement also provided that
Sadri and Teuscher were to share
the profits and losses equally. In
addition, the court noted that although Sadri presented evidence
that Teuscher had primary responsibility for managing BMS, Sadri
presented no evidence that
Teuscher prevented Sadri from exercising his partnership rights.
Therefore, because Sadri failed to
establish the third element of the
investment contract definition, the
court held that Sadri could not
recover under either the federal or
state securities laws.
The Washington Consumer
Protection Act
Sadri and the twelve limited
partners alleged that Teuscher's
misrepresentations also violated
Washington's Consumer Protection Act. Wash. Rev. Code §§
19.86.010 - .920 (1989) ("the

CPA"). Under the CPA, the plaintiff must prove (1) an unfair or
deceptive act or practice (2) in
trade or commerce (3) which affected the public interest; (4) injury
to plaintiff; and (5) a causal connection between the unfair or deceptive act and the injury suffered.
Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, Inc., 111 Wash. 2d 396,
759 P.2d 418, 422-423 (1988). On
appeal, Teuscher argued that Sadri
and the twelve limited partners
had not established the first, third
and fifth elements of the test. The
court rejected Teuscher's argument with respect to the limited
partners, but agreed that Sadri's
claim failed because he did not
establish that the deceptive acts
affected the public interest.
The Twelve Limited Partners.
The court stated that to prove the
first element, the plaintiff must
show that the alleged act had the
capacity to deceive a substantial
portion of the public. The plaintiff,
however, need not demonstrate
that the defendant actually inVolume 2, Number 2/Winter, 1990

tended to deceive anyone. The
court held that the twelve limited
partners satisfied this first element
by showing that the Teuscher's
misstatements were made to many
investors. In fact, Teuscher sought
out any investor who had large
amounts of cash. Thus, a substantial portion of the public could
have been deceived by Teuscher's
misstatements.
Next, the court addressed the
public interest element of the
twelve limited partners' CPA
claims. The defendant's acts affected the public interest if there is
a likelihood that others were injured in the same manner as the
plaintiffs. The court identified four
factors to be considered in determining whether the required public interest element of the CPA
claim was satisfied: (1) the act was
committed in the defendant's business; (2) the defendant advertised
to the public; (3) the plaintiff was
actively solicited by the defendant;
and (4) the plaintiff and defendant
occupied unequal bargaining positions. Not all of these factors need
be met, nor is any one dispositive.
In this case, Teuscher acted in
the scope of his business. He did
not advertise to find investors, but
he nonetheless actively solicited
investors. Teuscher occupied a superior bargaining position because
the twelve limited partners were
not sophisticated in the real estate
business and Teuscher was their
only source of information about
the investment. Taking all of the
factors into account, the court
found that the twelve limited partners had adequately established
the public interest element of their
CPA claims.
Finally, the court held that the
twelve limited partners had established the causation element of a
CPA claim. The court found that
had the twelve limited partners
known the truth about BMS, they
would not have invested. Therefore, the twelve limited partners
could recover under the CPA.
The General Partner. The court
held that Sadri, however, had
failed to prove his CPA claim. His
participation in the project was not
actively solicited by Teuscher.
Sadri was a sophisticated businessman with years of experience in

real estate development. He negotiated extensively with Teuscher
before forming the general partnership. Thus, the court held that
Sadri failed to meet the public
interest element of his CPA claim
because he did not prove that
Teuscher had superior bargaining
power. Therefore, the court reversed the jury's decision and directed judgment for Teuscher on
Sadri's CPA claim.
Sean J. Hardy

Tenth Circuit Holds that
Federal Common Law
Limits Uninsured
Depositors' Recovery
from Insolvent Lending
Institution to Pro Rata
Share of Assets
In Downriver Community Federal Credit Union v. Penn Square
Bank, 879 F.2d 754 (10th Cir.
1989), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that uninsured depositors who
were fraudulently induced to deposit money into the now-defunct
Penn Square Bank were entitled to
recover only a pro rata share of the
bank's assets. In so holding, the
court stated that federal common
law, rather than state law, governs
the post-insolvency relationship
between national banks and their
depositors.
Background: Credit Unions were
Fraudulently Induced to Purchase
Certificates of Deposit
In December 1981, Downriver
Community Federal Credit Union
("Downriver") and Wood Products Credit Union ("Wood Products") received glowing financial
reports regarding the Penn Square
Bank of Oklahoma City ("Penn
Square"). The reports were made
by investment brokers whose fees
were paid by Penn Square. In
reliance upon these reports, Downriver and Wood Products purchased 4.5 million dollars in Penn
(continued on page 50)
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